A bill termed Project Bioshield II is finding its way through Congress this summer. Its goal is to provide incentives for the pharmaceutical industry to develop countermeasures against bioterror weapons. But Bioshield II might be going too far trying to encourage pharmaceutical companies to invest in this endeavor.
Last year's Bioshield law aimed to expedite US National Institutes of Health research and development of countermeasures against biological weapons. It also gave the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the power to distribute promising treatments (even if they are not formally approved) in emergency situations. Last, the law earmarked $5.6 billion over ten years for the purchase by the government of countermeasures against bioterror agents. This commitment was intended to entice pharmaceutical companies into the biodefense market by providing them with a guaranteed buyer.
However, the response of the pharmaceutical industry to the initiative was lukewarm. Although companies welcomed the idea of a guaranteed market for their products, they felt that their most serious concern-the question of liability-had not been addressed. The law allowed the FDA to distribute unapproved treatments but did not protect companies from lawsuits if the drug failed or had adverse side effects.
Bioshield II is meant to address this concern by offering liability protections to companies that deliver biodefense products. In addition, it offers tax incentives and fast-track FDA review to spur investment in this research. But the controversial 'wild-card' provision of the new project would allow companies that develop a biothreat countermeasure to extend patent rights for up to two years on any medication in their portfolio. This includes blockbuster drugs that may have nothing to do with biodefense and can generate billions of dollars in yearly sales.
This radical idea is surprising, particularly considering that companies had not actively lobbied for this provision and so far have been cautious about endorsing it. Much more vocal has been the Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA), which labeled the proposal as outrageous and as a giveaway to the makers of brand drugs. The GPhA worries that patent holders may wait until the last minute to choose the drug on which they will exercise the patent extension, ruining plans to launch a generic version.
A revised version of Bioshield II has taken this concern into account, requiring companies to decide how they would use their wild card within 180 days from being awarded a contract. But as a result, companies may now miss out on the incentive altogether if they are forced to choose a specific patent too far in advance and its remaining lifetime is shorter than the time it takes them to develop a countermeasure.
The revision has not addressed another important concern of GPhA: a 1% increase in generic drug use would result in nearly $4 billion in savings for consumers. In other words, patent extensions will translate into further increases in the cost of healthcare in the US. So, if the main roadblock to private investment in countermeasures is protection from liability and the wild-card provision of Bioshield II does not satisfy either the brand or generic pharmaceutical industries, then there seems to be no strong reason to keep this part of the project.
Besides economic considerations, Bioshield II aims to rise above another important critique against the US government's emphasis on bioterrorism research. Organizations interested in finding cures against other conditions that have not been a priority of the pharmaceutical industry-AIDS, malaria and others-have criticized this emphasis, which they see as disproportionate to the support for research on neglected diseases. To counter this criticism, proponents of Bioshield II have extended the incentives to companies that deliver treatments against a range of neglected infectious diseases that also pose a global threat.
This strategy has already paid off handsomely from a public relations perspective, as it has earned Bioshield II the endorsement of organizations such as the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, the Infectious Diseases Society of America and the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene.
However, in 2002 an FDA regulation usually referred to as the 'animal efficacy rule' came into effect. According to this rule, evidence of a drug's effectiveness in different animal models can be used to obtain its approval for certain conditions in which efficacy cannot be ethically tested in humans. This rule, which still requires that safety trials in humans be conducted, has led to the approval of pyridostigmine bromide to increase survival after exposure to Soman nerve gas. By contrast, the need to conduct large-scale, time-consuming and expensive clinical trials to test treatments against AIDS or malaria cannot be avoided. It is therefore unclear whether companies enticed by Bioshield II will choose to invest in neglected diseases, instead of focusing on countermeasures against biological weapons.
Bioshield II has good intentions. Its proponents are trying to accommodate everybody's interests, hoping to obtain universal support for the Project to become law. But the question remains whether the Bioshield II Project is the best means to persuade the pharmaceutical industry to devote more resources to the fight against both bioterrorism and natural threats, or in the best interest of public health. As the Project waits for its turn to be evaluated in Congress, more discussion is needed on its economic, scientific and health impact and merits.
